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FIRST AMENDMENT-PROTECTED EXPRESSION-SELECTIVE PROSE-
CUTION-Wayte v. United States
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wayte v. United States,1 the Supreme Court held that
the passive enforcement policy, whereby the Government prose-
cutes only those persons who report themselves or who are re-
ported to the Selective Service as violators of the law, is consti-
tutionally sound and does not constitute impermissible selective
prosecution.2
The Supreme Court's decision in Wayte was its first pro-
nouncement on the selective prosecution defense since in 1962
Oyler v. Boles.3 The passive enforcement policy under scrutiny
in Wayte, however, brought to the Court, for the first time ever,
a claim of selective prosecution based on individual constitu-
tional rights and selection by federal officials.
Certiorari was granted to Wayte by the Supreme Court be-
cause of differences among the Circuit Courts of Appeal in their
assessment of selective prosecution claims brought in the con-
text of the first amendment.4 A majority of the circuits have ap-
plied a two part test under which the defendant must show dis-
proportionate selection as well as a prosecutorial motive to
punish or deter the exercise of first amendment rights. Since
these circuits have accepted a broad range of justifcations for
prosecutorial policies on nonspeech grounds, the motive test has
1. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
2. Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Burger, C.J., and White,
Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined.
3. 368 U.S. 448 (1962). In Oyler, West Virginia's habitual criminal statute which
mandated a life sentence upon the third conviction "of a crime punishable by confine-
ment in a penitentiary" was at issue. Some repeat offenders did not receive the harsh
sentence due to a lack of knowledge of their conviction history. Oyler argued that this
lack of uniformity in treatment violated his right to equal protection under the laws.
4. United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Wil-
son, 693 F.2d 500, 503-4 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 618 (7th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1307 (5th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
5. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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proved virtually impossible to meet.
This paper will attempt to show how under this approach,
first amendment values have been superseded by the motive re-
quirement. A brief historical analysis will demonstrate that the
motive requirement is rooted in equal protection review of ad-
ministrative action and has generally not been applied to first
amendment claims. A minority of the circuits, however, have re-
solved the tension between the first amendment and the require-
ment to show motive by renouncing such a requirement.'
The Supreme Court majority required of Wayte a showing
of impermissible governmental motivation in order to make a
prima facie case of selective prosecution. The Court held that
the case had properly been dismissed because this criterion had
not been met. The procedural posture of the case, however, also
merits attention. The proceeding had been halted at the discov-
ery stage. The decision to dismiss, therefore, precluded the de-
fendant from going forward in his attempt to establish a prima
facie case. The dissent, on the other hand, determined that the
defendant had made a showing sufficient to enable him to pro-
ceed with discovery in an effort to establish a prima facie case of
selective prosecution.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Facts of the Case
David Wayte, a nineteen year old philosophy student at
Yale University,' fell within the class of young men required to
register for military service.8 Instead of registering, however,
Wayte, in August of 1980, wrote to the Selective Service and to
President Carter voicing his intent not to register.' This letter
6. United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Schmucker,
721 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1983) (selective prosecution defense made out without showing of
motive); United States v. Cammisano, 546 F.2d 238 (8th Cir. 1976).
7. N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1985, at A18, col. 3.
8. Pursuant to his authority under sec. 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 50
U.S.C. App. § 453, President Carter issued Presidential Proclamation no. 4771, 3 C.F.R.
82 (1981). This proclamation directed male citizens and certain male residents born in
1960 to register with the Selective Service System during the week of July 21, 1980.
9. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 601 n.2. Wayte's letter of Aug. 4, 1980 to President Carter
stated, "I decided to obey my conscience rather than your law. I did not register for your
draft. I will never register for your draft. . . . I realize the possible consequences of my
action, and I accept them." Id. Wayte's second letter to the Selective Service stated:
[Vol. IV
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was then placed in a Selective Service file of letters sent to the
Service by men who either advised that they had not registered
or were reported by others as having failed to register.10 Due to
the passive enforcement policy adopted by the Selective Service,
this file constituted the only cases marked for investigation and
potential prosecution. 1 In June of 1981, the Selective Service
sent a letter to each of the men whose name appeared in the file
apprising them of their duty to register and of the potential for
prosecution. During the summer of 1981, a total of 285 names of
men who did not register pursuant to this June letter were for-
warded to the Department of Justice for investigation and po-
tential prosecution. 2
After screening the names of these nonregistrants, the De-
partment of Justice forwarded them to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and to the appropriate United States Attorneys."
The Department of Justice then instituted a "beg" policy, en-
couraging these late registrants to register and assuring them
that there would be no prosecution if they registered at that
time." ' The "beg" policy consisted of letters to the nonregis-
trants by the United States Attorneys and interviews with
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation before prosecution
began.
The Selective Service estimates that of the 9,039,000 men
Last August I wrote to inform you of my intention not to register for the
draft. thus far I have received no reply to my letter, much less any news
about your much threatened prosecutions. I must interpret your silence as
meaning that you are too busy or disorganized to respond to letters or keep
track of us draft-age youth. So I will keep you posted of my whereabouts.
Id. Wayte also stated that he would be "travelling the nation ... encouraging resistance
and spreading the word about peace and disarmament" and could be reached at his
home in Pasadena, California. Id.
10. Id. at 601.
11. Id.
12. Brief for the United States at 5, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598. The primary goal of the
prosecution policy according to the Department of Justice was to encourage and facili-
tate registration, to conduct an initial round of well publicized prosecutions, and to im-
plement a policy of leniency under which it would obtain voluntary compliance.
13. Id.
14. "The 'beg' policy was intended to afford nonregistrants a last opportunity to reg-
ister in order to prevent prosecution and it neglected the fact that the Department was
'trying to do everything we can to avoid prosecution unless we're forced into it.'" Id.
One Selective Service official stated that it was called the "beg" policy because the De-
partment decided "to beg people to register before [it] prosecuted them." Id.
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required to register, 674,000 did not.15 On May 21, 1982, prose-
cution of nonregistrants began. When Wayte's case came before
the district court, of the 674,000 men who had not registered, 13
men had been indicted.1 All thirteen were vocal nonregistrants
of the draft.
Petitioner asked the Supreme Court to dismiss his indict-
ment, to be allowed to proceed with the evidentiary hearing on
the selective prosecution claim, and for a ruling that the passive
enforcement system constituted an impermissible content-based
regulatory policy.17 The issue, according to the petitioner, was
whether the Selective Service may create a system whereby pro-
tected expression is the sole basis for investigation and prosecu-
tion of suspected nonregistrants."8 Petitioner did not contend
that not registering was itself protected under the first
amendment.
The Government, wanting an indictment, asked the Court
15. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598. By design and in practice, the
passive enforcement system selected for investigation only those who expressed opposi-
tion to the draft either publicly or by letter to government officials. As such, it was a
content-based regulatory system focusing exclusively on protected political expression,
thereby burdening the exercise of first amendment rights.
In response, the Government argued that the defendant was referred to the file
merely because he brought himself to the attention of the Selective Service. Brief for
United States at 12, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598.
16. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 604 n.3. "It is undisputed that the first 12 young men indicted
for nonregistration were identified as a result of letters they had written to government
officials." Brief for Petitioner at 31 n.19, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598.
By the fall of 1985, 18 active draft protesters had been prosecuted after making
public their status as a nonregistrants. At that time, about half of those 'draft resisters
were put on probation, and six had been incarcerated for up to two and one-half years.
All 18 of these indictments were obtained under the passive enforcement system, before
the Government began to use drivers' licenses to locate nonregistrants. Galante, Draft
Protester is Sentenced to Six Months House Arrest, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 23, 1985, at 4.
17. Brief for Petitioner at 17-20, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598. The petitioner argues that the
content of his letters represents core political speech on public issues that "has always
rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amentment values." NAACP v. Clai-
borne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982). "[S]peech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
Though the petitioner's proclamation of dissent from the law identifies him as a
violator, his speech is not stripped of its fundamental character as constitutionally pro-
tected speech. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598 (citing Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)).
18. "The question is not if the registration law is to be enforced, but how: Does exclu-
sive use of a First Amendment trip-wire for investigation and prosecution impermissibly
burden the exercise of protected rights?" Brief for Petitioner at 22, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598.
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for a ruling that the selection of Wayte was not impermissible
discriminition, that the selection did not violate the first amend-
ment and that the Government properly used an executive privi-
lege claim to withhold documents found by the district court to
be discoverable. 9
B. Procedural History
In July of 1982, David Wayte was charged with knowingly
and willfully not registering for the draft.2 ° His case underwent a
stormy trial proceeding. On September 27, the district court de-
termined that Wayte had alleged facts, sufficient at this stage of
the trial, to establish a "non-frivolous" showing of selective pros-
ecution and was therefore entitled to an evidentiary hearing.2
In evaluating the defendant's showing of selective prosecu-
tion, the trial court used a two-prong test that was first designed
to evaluate whether a prima facie case was established.22 Hence,
this standard was more stringent than the "non-frivolous" show-
ing normally needed at this point in the proceedings. Neverthe-
less, the defendant was required first to show that others simi-
larly situated generally had not been prosecuted for conduct
similar to that for which the defendant was prosecuted."3 The
19. Brief for United States at 26-29, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598. The government asserted
that petitioner was not impermissibly selected from among others similarly situated
based on his first amendment rights. Those indicted shared a legitimate characteristic
for distinguishing them: their violation was known to the government. The Government
went on to say that a confession of a violation is not protected by the first amendment.
20. United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1378 (1982).
21. Id. at 1379. The district court stated that in order to be granted an evidentiary
hearing, the defendant must allege enough facts to take the question beyond the frivo-
lous stage. See also United States v. Erne, 576 F.2d 212, 216 (9th Cir. 1978).
22. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1380 (citing United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1195
(9th Cir.), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1975); United States v. Berrios, 501
F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974)).
23. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1380. The finding of this first prong depends upon how
one defines "similarly situated vocal nonregistrants." The petitioner contends that the 13
individuals indicted were selected from among the 900,000 other nonregistrants on the
basis of their letters to government officials and that these letters represent protected
political speech. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598. The Government as-
serted that the petitioner misconstrued the relevant universe for evaluating the selectiv-
ity of the "passive enforcement" system. The Government determined that 1000 men
were reported to the selective service. Brief for Respondent at 14-15, Wayte, 470 U.S.
598.
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court held that this first prong was met.2 The second prong of
the test required a showing that the Government's discrimina-
tory selection of the defendant for prosecution was based on im-
permissible grounds, such as race, religion, or the exercise of the
first amendment right to free speech.2 This prong also was
deemed to have been met. The court stated that, "[tlhe infer-
ence is manifest that the defendant has been singled out for
prosecution because he exercised his first amendment right to
free speech. '26 The trial court also pointed out that in evaluat-
ing a selective prosecution claim, equal protection of the laws
extends to the application of those laws, not merely their
enactment.
2 7
The day after the court's determination that Wayte's mo-
tion to dismiss the indictment on the ground of selective prose-
cution was "non-frivilous," a hearing was held as to Wayte's dis-
covery requests.28 A total of six hearings were held on the
24. After discussing various memos sent by D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, and General Thomas K. Turnage, Director of the Selective
Service System, the district court said that "[t]he inference is strong that the Govern-
ment could have located non-vocal nonregistrants, but chose not to. For example, nonre-
gistrants could be located by using motor vehicle registration records in many states."
549 F. Supp. at 1381. In a letter to William French Smith on June 29, 1982, the Assistant
Attorney General stated that the defendants identified only by way of the passive en-
forcement system "are liable to raise thorny selective prosecution claims." Brief for Peti-
tioner at 5 n.9, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598.
25. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1381 (citing Steele, 461 F.2d at 1152). Steele succeeded in
showing selective prosecution of four individuals based upon their vocal opposition to
census requirements. "[An enforcement procedure that focuses upon the vocal offender
is inherently suspect since it is vulnerable to the charge that those chosen for prosecu-
tion are being punished for their expression of ideas, a constitutionally protected right."
Steele showed that there were six others who had not complied with the census and that
the system would have revealed their names.
26. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1382.
27. Id. at 1380 (citing United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1973)); Vick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). In Yick Wo, the City of San Francisco made
it illegal to operate a laundry without the permission of the board of supervisors unless
the laundry was located in a brick or stone building. The law appeared fair on its face;
the facts, however, showed that principally Chinese laundry operators were denied per-
mission to continue using wooden facilities. Criminal enforcement of the law was, there-
fore, held illegal by the Supreme Court.
The court in Falk pointed out that though Yick Wo dealt with an abuse of discre-
tion in the administration of a public ordinance by a city licensing board, "[tihe underly-
ing principle has nevertheless been properly held to apply to the actions of prosecutors
and police officials." 479 F.2d at 618.
28. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 616-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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discovery issue. Subsequent to these hearings, the court issued
an order rejecting the Government's assertion of executive privi-
lege and directing the Government to provide defendant with
certain documents and testimonies requested by him.29 The
Government refused to comply with this October 29 order. On
November 15, the district court filed an order and opinion dis-
missing Wayte's indictment."0
The court of appeals, in its review of the district court deci-
sion, required Wayte to show that others similarly situated had
not been prosecuted and that the prosecution was based on an
impermissible motive."1 The appellate court found the first
prong of the test to have been met. The court noted that of the
more than 600,000 men who had not registered, twelve were in-
dicted for failure to register, and all twelve were vocal nonregis-
trants.32 Wayte, however, did not demonstrate the impermissible
motivation needed to satisfy the second prong.3 Selectivity in
prosecution alone is not impermissible. s4 Petitioner, according to
the court of appeals, must show that the selection was based de-
liberately on an unjustifiable prosecutorial motivation. Given
the fact that the identities of other violators were not known,
the appellate court found that the Government had imposed a
logical enforcement policy. 6 Nonregistrants like Wayte who had
29. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1378-79. In determining whether a claim of executive
privilege was valid, the court used the standard announced in United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Applying the balancing test from Nixon to the facts, this court finds that the
scales of justice tip decidedly in the favor of the defendant's right to review
several of the documents which the court has inspected in camera. The Govern-
ment's generalized assertion of a 'deliberative process' executive privilege must
yield to the defendant's specific need for documents which this court has deter-
mined must be released to Mr. Wayte.
Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1378 n.1.
30. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1391.
31. United States v. Wayte, 710 F,2d 1385, 1387 (citing United States v. Ness, 652
F.2d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981)).
32. 710 F.2d at 1387.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing Oyler, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). "[Tlhe conscious exercise of some
selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation." Oyler, 368
U.S. at 456. It should be pointed out that in Oyler, no intentional discrimination against
the petitioner was alleged. In that case, Oyler attempted, by means of statistical evi-
dence, to demonstrate that not all repeat offenders were given the harsher sentences.
35. 710 F.2d at 1387.
36. Id. at 1388. The court of appeals noted that the passive enforcement system was
1987] 843
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expressed their intent not to register had made clear their willful
violation of the law. Thus, no impermissible motives were
implicated.
3 7
The Supreme Court, acknowledging the importance of the
issue and a division among the circuits, granted certiorari on the
question of selective prosecution. 8 In a 7 to 2 decision, the Su-
preme Court upheld the court of appeals.
III. PRECEDENTS
A. The Roots of Selective Prosecution Analysis in Equal
Protection Analysis
The origins of the current approach to selective prosecution
claims are to be found in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.3 9 This case in-
volved class discrimination based on race. Under a San Fran-
cisco ordinance, laundry businesses in wooden buildings were
banned unless a permit was obtained from the Board of Supervi-
sors. All but one of the white applicants received a permit; none
of the 200 Chinese who applied received a permit. The ordi-
nance, though valid on its face as a fire prevention regulation,
intended as merely a temorary plan to be used until the Government could develop a
more "active" enforcement system. The Government also claimed that the passive en-
forcement system was the only policy for which the Selective Service has authority and
resources. Brief for United States at 7, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598. The Selective Service stated
that they had problems obtaining current addresses through Social Security records and
that efforts to obtain current addresses from the Internal Revenue Service failed because
the Internal Revenue Service concluded that it was barred from disclosing such informa-
tion by 26 U.S.C. § 6103. Brief for United States at 9, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598.
A law student working with the defense, however, demonstrated easy access to state
driving license lists by calling four states at random and simply asking for them. 549 F.
Supp at 1381 n.6. These lists could have been compared with the Selective Service's
registration lists. In December of 1982, the Government implemented a new more "ac-
tive" policy relying on state driving licenses, which had always been available for en-
forcement purposes. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598.
37. The district court also dismissed Wayte's indictment on the ground that Presi-
dential Proclamation 4771 had not complied with the requisite notice and publication
requirements, and had therefore been improperly promulgated. The court of appeals re-
versed this finding, and the issue is now on appeal to the Supreme Court.
38. 470 U.S. at 607. Compare United States v. Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir.
1984)(upholding criminal conviction under passive enforcement scheme), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1003 (1985) with United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1983)
(ordering hearing on selective prosecution claim), cert. granted and vacated, 471 U.S.
1001 (1985); and Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385.
39. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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was struck down as a denial of equal protection. The Court
found that it was "applied and administered by public authori-
ties with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to
make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in simi-
1140lar circumstances .... .
In Snowden v. Hughes, the Court applied the reasoning of
Yick Wo to the administrative selection of individuals.41 Since a
decision to prosecute involves an executive action infused with
broad discretion, the selective prosecution defense engenders ju-
dicial review of administrative action.42 In Snowden, a Republi-
can primary runner-up was not certified by the state election
board, contrary to a state statute. Though stating that an indi-
vidual could maintain an equal protection action, the Court re-
jected this particular claim because the plaintiff had not proven
that the state proceeded with a hostile motive. Thus, there was
no federal cause of action asserted since there had not been an




In the case of Oyler v. Boles, the Court first considered a
defense of selective prosecution in the context of criminal en-
forcement.44 Oyler was prosecuted under the harsher of two re-
cidivists statutes in West Virginia. He claimed that his prosecu-
tion was a denial of equal protection since not every repeat
offender was prosecuted under the more severe habitual offender
statute. The Court rejected Oyler's selective prosecution claim
because he had not proven the nonprosecution of others simi-
larly situated, and because he had not shown a hostile motive.
The Court found that "[ilt was not stated that the selection was
deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification." 5 Though the Court
rejected the defense in Oyler and has never sustained such a de-
fense, important dictum appearing in Oyler suggested that in a
proper case the defense would be available.4 Before Wayte,
40. Id. at 373-74.
41. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
42. Note, Rethinking Selective Enforcement in the First Amendment Context, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 144, 151 (1984)(hereinafter Rethinking Selective Enforcement).
43. 321 U.S. at 7.
44. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).




Oyler was the Court's last pronouncement on the selective pros-
ecution defense.
Oyler dealt with an alleged selective prosecution by a state.
Over the last two decades, it has been left to the lower courts to
develop an analytical approach to those claims of selective pros-
ecution which do not involve a racial or arbitrary classification.
Courts of appeals have extended the selective prosecution de-
fense to encompass prosecutions by federal officials as well as
violations of individual constitutional rights. 7 The circuit
courts' expansion of the selective prosecution defense, however,
has remained within the structure of an equal protection ap-
proach. Though these cases do deal with federal violations of
federal rights, "few courts have been able to see beyond the
equal protection origins of the defense to apply the constitu-
tional guarantee directly."' 8
An often cited and recent articulation of the need to show
motive in an equal protection claim occurred in Personnel Ad-
ministrator of Mass. v. Feeney."9 The Court assessed a claim of
denial of equal protection of the laws to women, based on a state
Veterans Preference Statute granting lifetime preference to vet-
erans for civil service positions. The plaintiff asserted that the
law operated much to the advantage of men, given the propor-
tion of women to men within the class of veterans. The Court
upheld the state law because it was not shown that it reflected a
state purpose to discriminate on the basis of sex."' The Court
reaffirmed that for purposes of equal protection, though dispro-
portionate impact on a group due to a state statute may reflect
an invidious discrimination, "purposeful discrimination is the
condition that offends the United States Constitution.
'5 1
B. The Traditional First Amendment Analysis
Thus far, in order to sustain an action for selective prosecu-
tion, a defendant must prove that there was selection and that
47. See, e.g., United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973).
48. Rethinking Selective Enforcement, supra note 42, at 153.
49. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
50. Id. at 277.




the selection was intentional and stemmed from hostility to the
defendant or his exercise of constitutional rights. This hostile
motive requirement has been applied to the defense of selective
prosecution in the context of the first amendment.2 Motive,
however, is not a requirement for a successful challenge to Gov-
ernment action in any other first amendment context. 3 In fact,
the Court has often stated that good motives will not save legis-
lation that impinges on first amendment rights. 4 Thus, the ten-
sion between the two-pronged selective prosecution test and first
amendment doctrine is evident.
The Supreme Court held that an improper intent is not re-
quired when governmental action impinges on first amendment
liberties. In NAACP v. Alabama,55 the NAACP had refused to
comply with a court ordered disclosure of membership lists. The
objective of the court order was to ascertain the extent of
NAACP activity within Alabama in order to assess the organiza-
tion's compliance with the Alabama foreign corporation law.56
On appeal, the order was struck down by the Supreme Court.
The Court noted that the stated purpose of the government's
action appeared to be unrelated to first amendment rights. Nev-
ertheless, as Justice Harlan wrote in the majority opinion, "[i]n
the domain of these indispensable liberties, whether of speech,
press, or association, the decisions of this Court recognize that
abridgement of such rights, even though unintended, may inevi-
tably follow from varied forms of governmental action. ' 57 In the
1983 case of Minneapolis Star & Tribune,58 the Court reaf-
firmed the NAACP v. Alabama rule when it struck down a use
tax on large users of paper and ink. The Court stated:
We need not and do not impugn the motives of the Min-
nesota legislature in passing the ink and paper tax. Illicit
52. United States v. Wilson, 630 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1981); Steele, 461 F.2d 1148; Falk,
479 F.2d 616.
53. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575
(1983)(the Court struck down a use tax on large users of paper and ink); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968).
54. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 555.
55. 357 U.S. 449.
56. Id. at 451.
57. Id. at 463.
58. 460 U.S, 575.
1987]
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legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of
the First Amendment. . . . We have long recognized that
even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns
can restrict unduly the exercise of rights protected by the
First Amendment.
5 9
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,60  17 white
merchants filed suit in a Mississippi state court for losses arising
from a seven year boycott of their businesses by blacks seeking
racial equality and integration. It is important to note that even
in a civil lawsuit between private parties, the application of state
law, as determined by the courts, constitutes state action under
the fourteenth amendment. In Claiborne, therefore, a complete
prohibition of a nonviolent boycott designed to effectuate rights
guaranteed by the Constitution itself was held not to be justified
by a state's power to regulate economic activity. 1 The Court
held that the participants of the boycott were precluded from
being held liable for losses incurred for the boycott was politi-
cally motivated and designed to effectuate rights guaranteed by
the Constitution itself.62 Hence, the existence of an activity pro-
tected by the first amendment imposes restraints on the states'
regulatory power.
C. Prosecutorial Discretion
In the context of selective prosecution, judicial deference to
prosecutorial discretion must also be considered. In Marshall v.
Jerrico, Inc.,63 the Court compared the due process require-
ments applicable to a regional administrator, whose functions
resemble those of a prosecutor, and those applicable to a judge.
The Court stated in its discussion of criminal prosecutors:
Our legal system has traditionally accorded wide discre-
tion to criminal prosecutors in the enforcement pro-
59. Id. at 592-93.
60. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
61. Id. at 914.
62. Id. at 920.
63. 446 U.S. 238 (1980). In Marshall, an assistant regional administrator in the De-
partment of Labor's Employment Standards Administration assessed a total fine of
$103,000 in civil penalties for various violations of the child labor provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, and concluded that such violations were willful.
[Vol. IV
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cess .... Prosecutors need not be entirely "neutral and
detached." In an adversary system, they are necessarily
permitted to be zealous in their enforcement of the law."4
Thus, prosecutorial discretion may afford the segue between first
amendment analysis in which motive is irrelevant when infringe-
ment of constitutional rights is at stake, and an equal protection
analysis in which motive plays a more significant role.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS AMONG THE CIRCUITS
Pursuant to the Oyler dictum,6" nearly every judicial circuit
makes a selective prosecution defense available, and uses a two-
part test to assess the claim. In United States v. Berrios, the
Second Circuit articulated a test often referred to by those cir-
cuits requiring that the defendant demonstrate a hostile motive
on the part of the prosecutor.6
To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prose-
cution, the defendant bears the heavy burden of estab-
lishing, at least prima facie, (1) that, while others simi-
larly situated have not generally been proceeded against
because of conduct of the type forming the basis of the
charge against him, he had been singled out for prosecu-
tion, and (2) that the government's discriminatory selec-
tion of him for prosecution has been invidious or in bad
faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible considerations
as race, religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise of
constitutional rights."
Part one of the Berrios formulation contains the threshold
requirement that selection has taken place. Even this part of the
test, however, is not uniformly applied. There are essentially
three standards that are applied. Some courts require proof only
that other violators were not prosecuted. 8 Other circuits require
proof that other violators were not prosecuted, and that the gov-
ernment know at least generally that there were other viola-
64. Id. at 248 (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62 (1972)).
65. See supra notes 44-48.
66. 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
67. Id. at 1211.
68. United States v. Hazel, 696 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1983).
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tors. 9 In reference to the Wayte decision, the government knew,
based on studies of the Selective Service itself, that there were
many other nonregistrants. The most liberal articulation of this
prong of the analysis of unconstitutional selection criteria states:
"based upon impermissible grounds such as . . . the exercise of
constitutional rights. '70 This formulation at least suggests the
possibility that the defense may rest on good faith yet constitu-
tionally unsound distinctions. At the other end of the spectrum,
there are circuits which require a showing of personal hostility
on the part of the prosecutorial decisionmaker. For instance, a
court may require that "reprisal" 7' or a "desire to penalize" 72 be
shown.
There are, however, two procedural requirements that have
become part of the selective prosecution law which soften the
impact of the severe motive requirement. First, a defendant may
establish a prima facie case by alleging improper motive and
then introducing evidence raising doubt as to the prosecutor's
good faith.73 This entitles the defendant to shift the burden of
proof to the prosecutor. Second, the defendant may be aided if
he is able to allege facts sufficient to take the selective prosecu-
tion defense "past the frivolous stage. '74 In this instance, the de-
fendant is entitled to court ordered discovery of documents re-
lated to prosecutorial policy in order to prepare for an
evidentiary hearing on the claim.
The Government may rebut the defendant's showing of ei-
ther a prima facie case or an allegation of a nonfrivolous claim
by putting forth justifications for prosecuting the vocal offender.
Prosecutors may suggest that prosecuting vocal offenders has a
strong deterrent effect since these offenders are more likely to
command the public's attention.75 . Another rationale defers to
69. Wayte, 710 F.2d at 1387-88.
70. Rethinking Selective Enforcement, supra note 42, at 147 (citing United States v.
Wilson, 639 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1981)); United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599, 699
(5th Cir. 1977). A defendant has never been reported to have succeeded under this test.
71. United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 1975).
72. United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 86 (7th Cir. 1975).
73. See, e.g., Falk, 479 F.2d 616.
74. See, e.g., Wilson, 630 F.2d at 503; Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1212.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Hazel, 696 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Catlett, 584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1978). One may ask, however, whether this justification
betrays an attitude that willingly overlooks the right to express one's views and the value
to society derived therefrom.
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the need to allocate scarce funds, the lower cost of finding vocal
offenders thereby justifying the prosecutor's policy.7 The third
justification is based on the mens rea requirement of our crimi-
nal jurisprudence; if a defendant has made his dissident views
known," it is easier to establish a knowing violation.7 8 These
three justifications can dispose of a selective prosecution
defense.
Many circuits have been faced with cases in which the claim
of impermissible prosecution was based on an exercise of first
amendment rights. One commentator has stated, "a court faced
with the juxtaposition of the values served by these justifications
. . . and the values invoked by the first amendment. . . might
understandably pause before rejecting the selective prosecution
defense." 9
In United States v. Falk, the Seventh Circuit determined
that petitioner's allegations of selective and discriminatory
treatment, based on his exercise of first amendment rights, enti-
tled him to discovery of certain Government documents in prep-
aration for the defense of his charge of improper governmental
purpose in prosecution."0 Falk was indicted on two counts of
failing to possess either a draft registration or a draft classifica-
tion card. During the period of 1967-70, the Government did not
prosecute those nonregistrants who turned their draft cards over
to various officials in the Justice Department, the Selective Ser-
vice, or the local draft boards. Those protesters, however, who
participated in public demonstrations, for example, by burning
their cards, were prosecuted. The Court stated that "[tihere can
be no doubt but that the expression of views opposing this coun-
try's foreign policy with regard to Vietnam is protected by the
First Amendment."'"
76. See, e.g., Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1384.
77. 50 U.S.C. §462 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
78. See, e.g., Wilson, 639 F.2d 500 (the court deemed a tax protestor to have met the
willful requirement); see also United States v. Eklund, 551 F. Supp. 964 (S.D. Iowa
1982)(because the purpose of a passive enforcement policy was to distinguish the willful
from the innocent nonregistrants, the selective prosecution defense was rejected).
79. Rethinking Selective Enforcement, supra note 42, at 148-49; see also Wayte, 549
F. Supp. at 1385, rev'd, 710 F.2d 1385.
80. 479 F.2d 616. Falk was also indicted for failing to submit to induction into the
Armed Forces, but this count was not an issue on this appeal.
81. Id. at 620 (citing Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970)).
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The circumstances of Falk overcame the presumption of
good faith in prosecutorial conduct.8 2 The Court responded to
the threat posed by selective prosecution on the part of the gov-
ernment, and asserted that a decision to punish Falk due to his
draft counseling activities and his choice to assert his right as a
conscientious objector would corrode the prosecutorial system
and the necessary trust in such a system. The Court stated,
The Government may not prosecute for the purpose of
deterring people from exercising their right to protest of-
ficial misconduct and petition for redress of grievances.
Moreover, a prosecution under such circumstances would
be barred by the equal protection clause, since the Gov-
ernment employs an impermissible classification when it
punishes those who complain against police misconduct
and excuses those who do not.
83
Falk's previous judgment was vacated and the cause was re-
manded; the court of appeals determined that Falk was entitled
to a hearing on the offer of proof.
In United States v. Steele, the Ninth Circuit, the circuit
that first convicted Wayte, reversed a conviction and allowed a
defendant to proceed with proof of his discriminatory prosecu-
tion claim when selection stemmed from first amendment activi-
ties.8 The defendant, Steele, had publicly protested the census
as an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. Steele was later pros-
ecuted for not answering the census under 13 U.S.C. § 221(a),
whereas at least six others known to the appropriate government
officials to have not completed the census form but who did not
protest were not indicted. The Court found a "questionable em-
phasis" on public protesters, and stated that "[a]n enforcement
procedure that focuses upon the vocal offender is inherently sus-
pect, since it is vulnerable to the charge that those chosen for
prosecution are being punished for their expression of ideas, a
82. Falk, 479 F.2d at 621-23. For instance, Falk's status as a conscientious objector
was rejected; few indictments came from refusal to carry draft cards; various high offi-
cials were involved with Falk's prosecution; the U.S. Attorny was aware of Falk's draft
counseling activities and had stated that such activities caused trouble for him.
83. Id. at 623 (quoting Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 968 (1968)).
84. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972).
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constitutionally protected right. '8 5 The Court concluded that
Steele had demonstrated a purposeful discrimination on the part
of the census officials. Having made a prima facie case of selec-
tive prosecution, Steele had thus shifted the burden to the Gov-
ernment to justify its prosecutorial scheme.
A Sixth Circuit case, decided shortly after the circuit court
opinion in Wayte, allowed the selective prosecution defense.
This case, United States v. Schmucker, created great uncer-
tainty among the circuits, thereby prompting the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari to Wayte to settle the dispute.86 The
Schmucker Court articulated its test as follows:
[A]n indictment must be dismissed if (1) the defendant
has been "singled out" while other similarly situated vio-
lators are left untouched, and (2) the defendant's
selecton for prosecution was "based upon such impermis-
sible considerations as race, religion, or the desire to pre-
vent the exercise of his constitutional rights." A defend-
ant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he makes a
preliminary showing that there is a legitimate issue con-
cerning the government's conduct under this standard.8
The Schmucker Court characterized the issues presented by
the selective prosecution claim based on the passive enforcement
system differently than the Ninth Circuit did in Wayte. The
Sixth Circuit, in assessing the group selected for prosecution,
looked to the total group-all 674,000-of nonregistrants.8 8 In
this perspective, the question presented became, "whether a
prosecutorial policy violates the first amendment if it is directed
solely at the 'vocal nonregistrant' who openly objects to the law
on religious, moral or political grounds."89 The Court answered
this question in the affirmative, thereby entitling Schmucker to
an evidentiary hearing.
In Schmucker, the Court accepted the Government's char-
85. Id. at 1152.
86. United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1983). Like Wayte,
Schmucker was a draft nonregistrant who wrote to his congressman and the Department
of Justice asserting his intention not to register for the draft pursuant to President
Carter's proclamation.
87. Id. at 1048-49 (citing United States v. Hazel, 696 F.2d 473, 474 (6th Cir. 1983)).




acterization of the defendant's letter to public officials as a con-
fession, thereby condoning criminal prosecution. The Court,
however, went on to compare the prosecutorial selection policy
and the justification given to the Alien and Sedition Acts of the
1790's. "[A] law punishing only draft nonregistrants who pub-
licly confess by vocalizing their disagreement with the govern-
ment's policies would violate the principle that 'Congress shall
pass no law abridging free speech.' "90 The Court then asserted
that merely because criticism of governmental policy is accom-
panied by or perceived as a confession does not strip such criti-
cism of its first amendment protections. Hence, Schmucker was
deemed entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on his selective
prosecution claim.
IV. THE DECISION
A majority of the Supreme Court in Wayte affirmed the
court of appeals holding that petitioner put forth neither a selec-
tive prosecution claim nor violation of his first amendment
rights." The Court relied first on the principle that the Govern-
ment has broad discretion as to whom to prosecute. 2 As long as
the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
violated a statute, the decision to prosecute rests within the
prosecutor's discretion." The Court explained that the judiciary
is ill suited to review the prosecutor's decision to prosecute. Jus-
tice Powell, writing for the majority, expressed concern that a
chilling effect on law enforcement would result if the Court were
to conduct an examination of the basis of a prosecution. For in-
stance, such examination would delay and increase the cost of a
criminal proceeding. Further, the effect of an inquiry into
prosecutorial motive would undermine prosecutorial efficiency
90. Id. at 1050.
91. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 606-07 (1985).
92. Id. at 607.
93. Id. (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)). The broad discre-
tion is exercised by prosecutors pursuant to article II of the Constitution in which it is
stated that the executive power encompasses the power to see that laws are faithfully
executed. Brief for United States at 19, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598. The role of the judiciary
within this perspective is composed of "the very limited role of secondarily measuring
the primary decision of the prosecutor against constitutional standards." Id. at 24 (quot-




There are, however, constitutional constraints on executive
discretion and selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws.95
Specifically, the decision to prosecute may not be "deliberately
based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification;" 6 including the exercise of statu-
tory and constitutional rights. 7 There must, however, "be a
showing of clear and intentional discrimination."98
The district court acknowledged that there is a presumption
that prosecution for violation of criminal laws is undertaken in
good faith. 9 If the defendant, however, alleges intentional dis-
crimination and presents sufficient facts as to place the prosecu-
tor's motive in question, the presumption is defeated and the
burden shifts to the Government to establish good faith.'00 The
trial court found the Government's argument that the "passive
enforcement" policy was the sole means of locating known viola-
tors of the draft registration law disingenuous.' 01 The court re-
ferred to the fact that the Government could have used, as at
least one alternative method, motor vehicle registration records
and stated that "the inference was strong that the Government
could have located non-vocal nonregistrants, but chose not
to.' 0 2 The Supreme Court, however, found that the breadth of
prosecutorial discretion properly encompassed David Wayte's
circumstances. °8
The Court deemed it appropriate to judge selective prosecu-
94. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-08.
95. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
96. Id., quoted in Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608.
97. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982).
98. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944)(quoting Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S.
183, 186 (1900)).
99. 549 F. Supp. at 1383.
100. Id. (citing United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 620-21 (1973)). Jeffrey Falk was
found guilty of failing to possess a selective service registration card and a draft classifi-
cation card. On appeal, the circuit judge held that particular circumstances of prosecu-
tion for failing to possess either a registration or classification card placed a burden on
the Government of proving nondiscriminatory enforcement of the law. Falk was, there-
fore, entitled to be heard on his claim that the prosecution was actually for the purpose
of chilling his exercise of first amendment rights, and to punish him for participation in
a draft-counseling organization.
101. 549 F. Supp. at 1381.
102. Id.
103. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. at 607.
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tion claims according to ordinary equal protection standards.""
These standards require the petitioner to show that the passive
enforcement policy had not only a discriminatory effect, but was
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.'05
According to the Supreme Court majority, Wayte had not
shown that the enforcement policy selected people based on any
impermissible grounds, such as their speech. 06 "The facts
demonstrate that the Government treated all reported nonregis-
trants similarly.' 10 7 Thus, the Court did not find the "passive
enforcement" policy to engender a discriminatory effect. Wayte
would have had to have shown that the "passive enforcement"
policy deliberately selected nonregistranits for prosecution on the
basis of their speech. The "beg" policy instituted by the Depart-
ment of Justice, however, precluded such a showing.' 08 What the
petitioner did show, according to the majority, was that those
eventually prosecuted reported themselves to the Selective Ser-
vice as having violated the law; those who protested the registra-
tion, but did not report themselves as violators were not even
investigated. 09 "Indeed, those prosecuted, in effect, selected
themselves for prosecution by refusing to register after being re-
ported and warned by the Government. '"" 0
104. The fifth amendment does not contain an equal protection component. The ap-
proach to fifth amendment equal protection claims, however, has been "precisely the
same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 608 n.9
(quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)).
105. Equal protection of laws has come to mean that a policy involving discrimina-
tory impact was pursued because of that effect, not merely in spite of it. See Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
106. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 609.
107. Id. at 610. The dissent takes issue with the majority's position on this point, and
will be discussed later. See infra text accompanying notes 140-62.
108. Id.
109. Id. Petitioner pointed out, however, that even vocal protesters who were not
within the class required to register were referred for investigation; for example, an 80
year old minister, and several women. This evidence seems to contradict the majority's
assertion that only those who reported themselves as having violated the law were prose-
cuted, and supports petitioner's claim that the inevitable effect of the system was to
prosecute those who objected to the registration on religious and moral grounds, and
those who publicly refused to register. Brief for Petitioner at 23, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598.
110. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 610.
By simply registering after they had reported themselves to the Selective Ser-
vice, nonregistrants satisfied their obligation and could thereafter continue to
protest registration. No matter how strong their protest, registration immunized
them from prosecution. Strictly speaking, then, the passive enforcement system
COMMENTS
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall, with whom Jus-
tice Brennan joined, asserted that petitioner's claim did not in-
volve discrimination among known violators."' The claim as-
serted, according to Marshall, was that the system by which the
Department of Justice defined the class of possible prosecutees
was designed to discriminate against those who exercised their
first amendment rights.
112
The Government's position, however, with which the major-
ity agreed, is that to focus on the 13 indicted as the group se-
lected for prosecution, instead of all of the reported nonregis-
trants, misconceives the relevant context for evaluating the
selectivity of the passive enforcement program."' Of the 1000
reported nonregistrants, 11 only 13 did not avail themselves of
the opportunity to bring themselves within the law. The 13 in-
dicted shared a characteristic that separated them from the
other nonregistrants: they were known to the Selective Service
as probable violators of the registration law. They were, there-
fore, not similarly situated to those not chosen for indictment,
and this quality afforded a proper basis of selection for prosecu-
tion. From this perspective, the defendant must prove that the
Government failed to prosecute persons it knew had violated the
laws. Equal protection of the laws, therefore, would not be vio-
lated where the failure to proceed against another was due to
lack of knowledge of their offenses." 5
According to the majority, Wayte had not met his burden of
proof with regard to either prong of the two-part test which the
penalized continued violation of the Military Selective Service Act, not speech.
Id. at 611 n.12.
111. Id. at 630 (emphasis in original).
112. Id. "If the Government intentionally discriminated in defining the pool of po-
tential prosecutees, it cannot immunize itself from liability merely by showing that it
used permissible methods in choosing whom to prosecute from this previously tainted
pool." Id.
113. Brief for United States at 26, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598.
114. Id. at 10, Oversight Hearing.
115. Id. at 27 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456):
It is not sufficient to allege nothing more than a failure to prosecute others be-
cause of a lack of knowledge of their . . . offenses. . . . Under this standard, in
order to prove that others similarly situated generally had not been prosecuted
. . the defendant must show that the government knew of a number of viola-




Court applied. He had shown neither discriminatory effect, nor
Government intent to produce such a result.' 6 Petitioner would
have to show that the Government prosecuted him because of
his protest activities, in order to prove discriminatory pur-
pose.11 7 The Court acknowledged that petitioner had shown that
the Government was aware that its enforcement policy would re-
sult in prosecution primarily of vocal objectors who would bring
selective prosecution claims. The Court noted, however, "dis-
criminatory purpose implies more than . . . intent as awareness
of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part be-
cause of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an iden-
tifiable group.""' 8
Thus, petitioner had not stated a cause of action for selec-
tive prosecution under the equal protection standards used by
the Court to assess such a claim. He had shown neither discrimi-
natory effect on those reported as nonregistrants, which is re-
quired under the Court's definition of those "similarly situated"
to the petitioner, nor had he shown the requisite intent on the
part of the Government to prosecute on the impermissible basis
of first amendment rights. The majority never addressed the
possibility that "similarly situated" could be defined as non-
registrants in general, though the definition given clearly im-
pacts the inferences drawn from the Government's policy.
The petitioner also challenged the "passive enforcement"
system directly on first amendment grounds, contending that it
116. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608-10.
117. Id. at 610.
118. Id. (quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1970)). There is little doubt that the Selective Service as well as the Department of
Justice were aware of the impact this system would have-on vocal nonregistrants and the
potential for first amendment problems. The majority, however, appears to neglect the
potential danger recognized even by the Government. For instance, David Kline, the Jus-
tice Department official responsible for the overall enforcement of the draft registration
law, stated that the decision whether or not to make referrals rested entirely with the
Selective Service. The "passive enforcement" policy provided the only lists of suspected
nonregistrants. A letter drafted by Kline for Assistant Attorney General D. Lowell Jen-
sen to send to Herbert Puscheck, the Associate Director of Plans and Operations for
Selective Service, stated that "indeed, with the present universe of hundreds of
thousands of nonregistrants, the chances that a nonregistrant will be prosecuted is prob-
ably about the same as the chances that he will be struck by lightning." Brief for Peti-
tioner at 6, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598.
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created a "content-based regulatory system with a concomi-
tantly disparate, content-based impact on nonregistrants.""
Wayte did not claim that not registering was entitled to protec-
tion by the first amendment. 10 He claimed, however, that the
enforcement policy was activated by defendant's first amend-
ment activity conveying a particular political message, and not
by any violation of the draft registration law itself.12 ' From the
petitioner's perspective, the issue revolved around how the regis-
tration policy was to be enforced, and whether "a First Amend-
ment trip-wire for investigation and prosecution impermissibly
burden[ed] the exercise of protected rights."'
22
The Supreme Court, in United States v. O'Brien, held that
when, as here, speech and nonspeech elements are combined, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech conduct could justify any incidental impact on
speech.1 23 Thus, the government regulation charged here with
being a content-based regulatory system with disparate impact
on nonregistrants would be justifed if, according to the O'Brien
standard,
it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
if it furthers an important governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on al-
leged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is es-
sential to the furtherance of that interest.'
24
O'Brien articulated a first amendment standard that had been
applied by the courts for many years previous.
Wayte asserted that the fundamental character of vocal pro-
test as constitutionally protected speech is not disturbed even
though the proclamation may also identify the protestor as a vi-
119. Brief for Petitioner at 23, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598.
120. Id. at 21. This distinguishes Wayte from O'Brien, who claimed that destroying a
draft certificate was not a criminal activity under 50 U.S.C. §462(b)(5).
121. Since quiet nonregistrants were effectively immune from prosecution, it was ar-
gued that the passive enforcement system essentially made registration voluntary, but
criticism of registration tantamount to a crime. Rethinking Selective Enforcement,
supra note 42.
122. Brief for Petitioner at 22, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598.
123. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
124. Id. at 377.
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olator of that law.' 25 Though Wayte's stated intention "to obey
his conscience rather than the law" and to not register could be
used as evidence in a prosecution against him, the message's op-
position to the draft is still politically expressive speech and en-
titled to constitutional protection.'
The Court applied the O'Brien test for assessing the burden
on the speech and nonspeech elements of Wayte's conduct. It
concluded, as to the first requirement, that the issuance of the
President's draft registration proclamation was within the con-
stitutional power of the Government. 7 The Court then pro-
ceeded to consider the third requirement, stating that the Gov-
ernment's interest in registering young men into the draft is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 28 The Court
then stated, in response to the second criteria, that the Govern-
ment's conduct furthered an "important or substantial govern-
mental interest", and that the Nation's need to provide for its
own security was compelling. " The Court reiterated the princi-
ples that the power to "classify and conscript manpower for mil-
125. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
126. "Wayte's message is no less politically expressive than the armbands held to be
a constitutionally protected 'silent symbol of opposition to this Nation's part in the con-
flagration in Vietnam.' " Brief for Petitioner at 21, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598 (quoting Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969)). In Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971), the first amendment was held to forbid a conviction
for disturbing the peace based on the defendant's wearing a jacket with the words "Fuck
the Draft" on the back. Justice Harlan stated in his opinion:
Much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not
only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inex-
pressible emotions as well. . . . We cannot sanction the view that the Constitu-
tion, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or
no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be
the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. Wayte asserts that both cognitive and emotive significance are
manifest in his expression of noncompliance with the draft registration law. Brief for
Petitioner at 22, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598.
127. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. at 607.
128. Id.
129. Id. In his dissent in O'Brien, Justice Douglas agreed that
the constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies is "broad and
sweeping" and the Congress' power "to classify and conscript manpower for mil-
itary service is beyond question." This is undoubtedly true in times when, by
declaration of Congress, the Nation is in a state of war. The underlying and
basic problem in this case, however, is whether conscription is permissible in the
absence of a declaration of war.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 389.
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itary service is 'beyond question,'" and is "broad and
sweeping." '"3
With this strong Government interest at stake, the Govern-
ment's justifications for the passive enforcement policy were ac-
cepted by the Court. Firstly, the Court accepted that, as alleged
by the Government, the passive enforcement system promoted
prosecutorial efficiency. By relying on reports of nonregistration,
the Government could identify and prosecute violators immedi-
ately, while a search for likely violators would have been costly
and difficult.' Secondly, the defendants' letters provided strong
evidence of intent not to comply with the draft registration
proclamation. 13 2 The third rationale put forth was that prosecut-
ing those nonregistrants who made their views public would fur-
ther deterrence. 33
With this groundwork in principles of both constitutional
interpretation and policy, the Court held that the Government
satisfied the last criteria of the O'Brien test as well: the restric-
tions on first amendment freedom were no more than that essen-
tial to the furtherance of the Government's interest in ensuring
registration for the nation's defense."" The Court found that the
enforcement policy did not place any special burden on vocal
nonregistrants, and was intended only as an interim enforce-
ment system.
3 5
130. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 612 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377); accord Lichter v.
United States, 344 U.S. 742, 755 (1948).
If. . .it should be resolved to extend the prohibition to the raising of armies in
time of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary
spectacle which the world has yet seen-that of a nation incapacitated by its
Constitution to prepare for defense before it was actually invaded.
THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 165 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
131. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 612.
132. Id. at 612-13. "Section 12(a) of the Military Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 622,
as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 462(a), provides that a criminal nonregistrant must 'evad[e] or
refus[e]' to register." For conviction, courts have uniformly held that the Government
must prove that a defendant's failure to register was intentional. See, e.g., United States
v. Boucher, 509 F.2d 991 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Rabb, 394 F.2d 230 (3d Cir.
1968).
133. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 613. One may ask, however, how the Government's policy
furthers any general deterrent interest since it is not a general enforcement policy. As
the defendant's brief points out, the policy encourages silence, not compliance. Brief for
Petitioner at 15, Wayte, 470 U.S. 598.
134. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 613.
135. Id. It is interesting to note that the passive enforcement policy remained the
only policy for over three years. Finally, the Government began to use state driver's li-
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Finally, the Court stated that the defendant had not suc-
cessfully proved that the passive enforcement policy implicated
a first amendment right.136 Rather, the majority held, the peti-
tioner's argument applied to self-reporting, not to the Govern-
ment's policy. A confession is not protected by the first amend-
ment, therefore, petitioner had no first amendment claim.137
Given the "beg" policy instituted by the Justice Department,
the nonregistrant's only obligation was to register, thereafter he
could have protested unfettered. 138 It is significant that the
majority considered the appropriate class to be reported non-
registrants, not all registrants. Since the Government investi-
gated all reported nonregistrants, the Court found no discrimi-
nation among the class on first amendment grounds. 39 Thus,
any influence from first amendment analysis was rejected and
the traditional equal protection standard was reaffirmed as the
proper test for selective prosecution claims in the context of vio-
lations of constitutional rights.
V. THE DISSENT
In their dissent, Justices Marshall and Brennan construed
the issue to be whether the petitioner had earned the right to
cense records. Id.
136. Id. at 613-14. In the courts below, Wayte argued that he had been prosecuted
based on an impermissible motive under the traditional equal protection standard which
governs the selective prosecution defense. Before the Supreme Court, however, petitioner
argued that his prosecution violated the first amendment. This claim of selective prose-
cution based on the exercise of first amendment rights is the first such case before the
Supreme Court.
137. Id. at 614.
138.
By simply registering after they had reported themselves to the Selective Ser-
vice, nonregistrants satisfied their obligation and could thereafter continue to
protest registration. No matter how strong their protest, registration immunized
them from prosecution. Strictly speaking, then, the passive enforcement system
penalized continued violation of the Military Selective Service Act, not speech.
Id. at 611 n.12.
139. But see id. at 629-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As the dissent elucidates, the
lens through which the majority views the issue takes in all reported nonregistrants.
When the Court says, therefore, that the first amendment is not implicated and that the
only consideration is that the person had been reported to the Government, the Court is
cutting off its analysis before looking at how these men got on the list in the first in-
stance. Though given the opportunity to avoid prosecution by registering under the
"beg" policy, the only way of achieving the status of a nonregistrant on the list was by
making public one's dismay with the President's proclamation.
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have granted to him the discovery requests ordered by the dis-
trict court. 40 The dissent argued that in order for Wayte to have
prevailed at this stage, he needed only to show that the district
court applied the proper legal standard, without abusing its dis-
cretion, in finding that Wayte had made a nonfrivolous showing
of selective prosecution thereby earning him the right to dis-
cover relevant Government documents."" The grant of certio-
rari, the dissent contended, was properly limited to the issue of
conflict among the circuits as to the standard used to determine
whether a petitioner has made out a selective prosecution
claim.4 2 The threshhold question, therefore, was whether Wayte
had presented evidence of constitutional violation sufficient to
entitle him to discovery of government documents and to sub-
poena the requested Government officials. If Wayte had
presented sufficient evidence, then the merits of the case ought
not to have been addressed until the record was complete.'43
Marshall and Brennan outlined a two-part inquiry in order
to resolve whether Wayte was entitled to the discovery requests.
First, there must be a determination as to the showing a defend-
ant must make in order to obtain discovery on an affirmative
defense of selective prosecution.'" Second, there must be a de-
termination of the standard under which a court of appeals may
review a district court's finding that the required showing was
140. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 614-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In response to this discov-
ery order, the Government stated: "It is obvious that the Court's appetite for more and
more irrelevant disclosures of sensitive information has become insatiable. It is also ap-
parent that with each new disclosure, made pursuant to near-impossible deadlines, the
Court feels compelled to impugn the motives of the Government." Record at 3 (Doc. No.
95).
141. 470 U.S. at 615-16. In order to sustain his claim, Wayte presented internal Jus-
tice Department memoranda which discussed the prosecution process for prosecuting
men who had not registered for the draft; a report discussing alternatives to the registra-
tion program by the U.S. General Accounting Office; a transcript of a Department of
Defense Military Manpower Task Force; and a statement by the Director of the Selective
Service before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice of the House Judiciary Committee.
142. "The direct conflict between the Sixth and Ninth Circuits on an issue concern-
ing the exercise of first amendment rights particularly in view of the pending prosecu-
tions in other circuits raising the identical question justifies the grant of certiorari to
review the judgment below." Id. at 622 n.l.(quoting Pet. for Cert.).
143. "The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded
on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts." Id. at 624 (quoting United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)).




The circuit courts, according to the dissent, have adopted a
standard under which a defendant has established his right to
discovery if he has put forth "a colorable basis" for a selective
prosecution claim." In other words, if a defendant has alleged
facts sufficient "to take [his selective prosecution claim] past the
frivolous stage," he has made the necessary showing. 147 In gen-
eral, the dissent assessed that a defendant must present "some
evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements
of the defense."' 4 The dissent concluded that the standard ap-
plied by the district court was well-founded and "consistent with
our exhortation that '[t]he need to develop all relevant facts in
the adversary system is both fundamental and
comprehensive.' "149
As to the determination of the proper scope of review, the
dissent stated that the district court ought to be afforded great
deference in discovery matters and be subject to review under an
abuse of discretion standard.150 Marshall and Brennan were
troubled by the fact that the court of appeals did not mention
the proper standard for review of the district court's finding that
petitioner had made a nonfrivolous showing of selective prosecu-
tion. According to the dissent, the appellate court undertook its
own inquiry, based on the record, thereby shunning the district
court's careful supervision of the discovery process and its "nar-
rowly tailored" rulings.' 5'
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599, 600 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Cammisano, 546 F.2d 238, 241 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Berrios, 501
F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973)).
147. United States v. Hazel, 696 F.2d 473, 475 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Erne,
576 F.2d 212, 216 (9th Cir. 1978).
148. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. at 624 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Ber-
rios, 501 F.2d at 1211).
149. Id. (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709).
150. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 624.
Enforcement of a pretrial subpoena duces tecum must necessarily be committed
to the sound discretion of the trial court since the necessity for the subpoena
most often turns upon a determination of factual issues. Without a determina-
tion of arbitrariness or that the trial court finding was without record support,
an appellate court will not ordinarily disturb a finding that the applicant for a
subpoena complied with the [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 17(c).
Id. (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 702).
151. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 624 (dissenting opinion).
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A proper departure point for the appellate court would have
been to determine whether the district court had abused its dis-
cretion in holding that Wayte had made a nonfrivolous showing
of selective prosecution. Although conscious that the defendant's
burden in order to get discovery would be only to make a non-
frivolous showing, 52 the dissent considered the elements neces-
sary to establish a prima facie case in order to evaluate the merit
of Wayte's claim and to thereby assess the district court's
finding.
The dissent agreed with the majority that Wayte's selective
prosecution claim presented an equal protection challenge to the
passive enforcement system. 153 There are three elements neces-
sary to make a prima facie showing. First, Wayte would have to
have shown that he was a member of a recognizable, distinct
class. The district court found this criteria to be clearly met.
Wayte was a member of a class of vocal nonregistrants who exer-
cised their first amendment right to speak freely and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.
54
As to the second element, Wayte would have to have shown
that under the enforcement policy through which the Selective
Service referred names to the Justice Department for investiga-
tion, only the names of those men who were either reported by
others as not having registered or who wrote to the Selective
Service explaining their refusal to register subjected the class to
disproportionate selection for investigation and potential prose-
cution. The record does not reveal how many of the approxi-
mately 300 men whose names were referred to the Justice De-
partment were "vocal." Officials in the Department of Justice,
however, knew that vocal opponents to the draft would comprise
the majority of those selected. 55 The defendant put forth at
152. Id at 625. See also United States v. Hazel, 696 F.2d at 475; United States v.
Erne, 576 F.2d at 216.
153. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. at 626 (citing Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456; Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. at 373).
154. Id. at 626-627 (dissenting opinion).
155. Id. at 627. Assistant Attorney General Jensen stated in a memorandum:
Selective Service's enforcement program is presently "passive." Nonregistrants
are brought to the Service's attention either when they report themselves or
when others report them. Consequently, the first prosecutions are liable to con-
sist of a large sample of (1) persons who object on religious and moral grounds,
and (2) persons who publicly refuse to register.
Id. at 628 (memorandum from Jensen to various United States Attorneys).
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least a "colorable" claim, according to the dissent, as to this
branch of the standard.
The final element that must be shown in order to make out
a prima facie claim is that the selection procedure was not neu-
tral, or somehow subject to abuse. Since the enforcement scheme
was implemented with the full knowledge of the effect on vocal
opponents, the third element of the standard for alleging a
prima facie case was also met."'0 Given this knowledge, the
choice to implement the passive enforcement system was one
susceptible to abuse, thereby making the whole scheme vulnera-
ble to charges of first amendment violations. 157 The dissent
noted the correlation here between vocal opposition and violat-
ing the law, which would thereby make it quite easy to punish
speech under the guise of enforcing the laws.'
The defendant, therefore, had put forth a colorable claim as
to the second element and had established the first and third
elements. There could be no doubt, under the dissent's ap-
proach, that the district court had not abused its discretion in
finding that Wayte's equal protection claim was not frivolous.
The majority, however, did not set out to determine
whether Wayte was entitled to discover relevant information
from the Goverment. Instead, the Court immediately assessed
the merits of Wayte's selective prosecution claim according to an
equal protection standard. The dissent found this assessment
premature.1
9
Marshall and Brennan also found that the majority erred in
its focus on reported nonregistrants.' 60 The Court addressed the
claim as one of discrimination among known violators of the
draft registration law. Hence, the "beg" policy, which gave those
known violators the option of registering and escaping prosecu-
156. Id. at 628 (dissenting opinion).
157. Id. In Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 (1979), the
Court stated that "[a]dherence to a particular policy or practice, with full knowledge of
the predictable effects of such adherence . . . is one factor among others which may be
considered by a court in determining whether a decision was based on an impermissible
ground." The dissent also quoted United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.
1973): "[T]o discern the purposes underlying facially neutral policies, this Court has . ..
considered the . . . forseeability of any disproportionate impact."
158. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 628 (dissenting opinion).




tion, removed the shadow of an equal protection violation from
the passive enforcement system. The dissent, however, focused
on the system used to define the potential prosecutees. 1 1 "If the
Government intentionally discriminated in defining the pool of
potential prosecutees, it cannot immunize itself from liability
merely by showing that it used permissible methods in choosing
whom to prosecute from this previously tainted pool. 1 8' 2 Thus,
the Court ought to have concentrated on the referrals made by
the Selective Service to the Justice Department leading to
prosecution.
VI. CONCLUsIoN
This opinion determines that in order to set forth a first
amendment selective prosecution defense, a defendant must es-
tablish a prosecutorial motive to deter or punish the defendant's
protected first amendment expression. In spite of the potential
danger of infringing constitutionally protected political speech,
the Court refused to include in its equal protection analysis a
test appropriate for content-based regulations or to apply the
balancing test that would usually be applied whenever a general
regulation incidentally infringed first amendment rights. Fur-
thermore, the Court required that it be proved that the Govern-
ment failed to prosecute individuals it knew to be violators. The
Court, therefore, applied the strictest test used by the circuits.
By requiring a defendant to show impermissible selection and
motive, and by demanding that such a prima facie showing be
made in order to obtain discovery, the Court has made it virtu-
ally impossible for a defendant to gather the evidence required
to make such a showing.
It ought to be noted that the Court addressed and summa-
rily dismissed the claim that the prosecution scheme placed a
direct burden on Wayte's first amendment rights. Such a scheme
was neither presented nor ruled upon at either the district court
or the court of appeals, nor was it raised in the petition for cer-
tiorari. In other words, why did the majority not adhere to the
discovery issues raised pursuant to the procedural posture of the
case? This impatience to dispose of all the constitutional issues,
161. Id. at 628-29.
162. Id. at 630.
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even those not directly raised by the selective prosecution de-
fense, suggest that the Court was carrying out its own agenda.
Unfortunately, this appears to be one that shies away from and
perhaps subverts this country's tradition of free speech, even
when such behavior carries dissent and grievances.
It is revealing and troubling that the majority's decision
compares a conscientious objector to "any criminal" 163 in its
analysis of the first amendment issues. David Wayte, and the
seventeen other men indicted under the passive enforcement
policy were acting out of deeply held religious and social convic-
tions that compliance with the military build up in this country
is morally wrong. The courage to obey one's conscience, to dis-
sent and to speak freely in the face of the perpetually escalating
armament programs reveals a resource and strength available to
this country that is greater than weapons could ever be.
The Court's characterization of the group from which the
defendant is selected, as well as the characterization of Wayte's
criticism as confession rather than protest made inevitable the
Court's dismissal of Wayte's defense. As Justice Harlan warned
in Cohen v. California, however, "we cannot indulge the facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also
running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.
Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of
particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expres-
sion of unpopular views." 16' Wayte may expose the sorry devel-
opment that the Court is allowing the Government to prohibit
criticism of itself, while stating that it is prosecuting confes-
sional words.
The great majority of claims of illegal discrimination in the
enforcement of criminal laws is dismissed with a reference to
Oyler v. Boles and a statment that some selectivity in prosecu-
tion is necessary and not violative of the Constitution. Few, if
any, would argue for chilling a prosecuter's flexibility and effi-
ciency. Such a result would run counter to the public welfare.
However, "(tihe judiciary has always borne the basic responsi-
bility for protecting individuals against unconstitutional inva-
163. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 624 (dissenting opinion).
164. 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
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sions of their rights by all branches of Government. ' ' 165 Such a
statement articulates a crucial role of the courts in this country,
and one that was not conscientiously carried out in Wayte.
Donnaldson K. Brown
165. United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 624 (1975) (quoting Stamler v. Willis, 415
F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. den'd, 399 U.S. 929 (1970)).
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